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ABSTRACT 
Animal welfare is a tbpic often thought o reside outside mainstream biology. The complexity of
the methods used to assess welfare (such as health, physiology, immunological state, and behavior) 
require an understanding of a wide range of biological phenomena. Furthermore, the "welfare" 
of an animal provides a framework in which a diversity of its responses can be understood as 
fitness-enhancingmechanisms. Different methodsfor assessing animal welfare are discussed, with 
particular emphasis on the role of an animal's own choices and reinforcement mechanisms. No 
part of biology is as yet able to explain consciousness, but by confronting the possibility that 
nonhuman animals have conscious experiences of suffering, animal welfare studiesfarce a consid- 
eration of even this hardest problem of all biological phenomena in a particularly direct and 
evolutionary way. 
INTRODUCTION 
HOW CAN THERE be a scientific study of 
animal welfare? If "welfare" just means 
"health," then isn't animal welfare simply vet- 
erinary science or animal health studies under 
anothet name? And if animal welfare goes be- 
yond this and tries to take on mental as well as 
physical suffering, how can it be more than an 
unscientific collection of assumptions-im- 
possible to test-about what animals might or 
might not be feeling? 
The intent of this article is to show that ani- 
mal welfare, far from being a fringe activity 
outside mainstream biology, could potentially 
be at the heart of biological thinking about 
fitness-enhancing mechanisms in a variety of 
disciplines. Assuming that "welfare" includes 
not only current health status but also a variety 
of behavioral, physiological and immunologi- 
cal indications that health status is likely to 
change for better or for worse in the future. I 
shall argue that many of the so-called "indica- 
tors" of welfare that have been put forward are 
best seen as evolutionary adaptations, either 
enabling the animal to counteract a threat to 
its health and fitness or, in the unnatural envi- 
ronments in which humans often keep ani- 
mals, showing that the animal has failed in its 
attempts to do so. An action or physiological 
response that is effective in the wild may 
become pathological and counterproductive 
within the confines of a cage. One of the rea- 
sons why so many problems have been en- 
countered in the study of "welfare," "stress,;, 
"suffering" and related concepts is because an- 
imal welfare studies have generally lacked the 
evolutionary framework that characterizes so 
much else in biology. Animal welfare, in other 
words, needs a dose of Darwinian medicine 
(Nesse and Williams 1995). 
Before this treatment can be administered, 
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however, it is necessary to distinguish three 
types of questions that are often raised about 
animal welfare, but are almost equally often 
confused. The first one is, what objective mea- 
surements-biochemical, physiological, be- 
havioral-should we use to evaluate whether 
the welfare of an animal is poor or good. As 
discussed below, biochemistry, physiology and 
behavior are all respectable scientific disci- 
plines, and there is no real problem about us- 
ing them in animal welfare studies. Their use 
might be controversial and their interpreta- 
tion may be subject to doubt in some circum- 
stances, but their scientific redentials are not. 
The second type of question is, however, 
more difficult. Are animals that can be shown 
to have these objectively measured symptoms 
consciously experiencing what humans would 
call suffering, if we were experiencing these 
same symptoms? For example, if a nonhuman 
animal shows clinical signs of exhaustion, and 
these are comparable to those that give rise to 
very unpleasant experiences in humans, are 
we justified in concluding that the animal is 
also suffering? This kind of question poses 
more problems than the first one because it 
touches on the greatest remaining mystery in 
biology-that of conscious experience. Deter- 
mining if an organism is conscious or not raises 
difficulties of a different order of magnitude 
from finding out whether a particular treat- 
ment results in a raised hormone level, for in- 
stance. Despite the avalanche of books that 
has recently appeared on the subject of con- 
sciousness (e.g., Dennett 1991; Edelman 1992; 
Crick 1994; Penrose 1994; Weiskrantz 1997), 
we have not achieved the same level of un- 
derstanding about consciousness as we have 
(through objective measurements) about hor- 
mones and behavior. Insofar as it concerns it- 
self with conscious experiences of suffering in 
animals, the study of animal welfare could be 
accused of straying off the straight and narrow 
path of what is strictly scientific. 
Yet, when people express a concern about 
animal welfare, it is precisely the conscious ex- 
perience of suffering that worries them most. 
Animal welfare has a higher moral profile 
than, say, plant welfare, because more people 
believe that animals consciously suffer than 
believe that plants do. Orchid growers may be 
concerned about the health and growth of 
their plants in the way that dog owners care 
about that of their pets, but it is the belief that 
animals have something extra-a mental ca- 
pacity for experiencing pain, thirst, boredom 
and other mental states-that gives animal 
welfare its moral edge (Duncan 1993). This 
argument is also reflected in the scientific lit- 
erature, where it has been held that "suffer- 
ing" includes mental suffering (Dawkins 1990; 
Webster 1994), and even that suffering does 
not occur unless there is a conscious experi- 
ence (Duncan 1993, 1996; Duncan and Peth- 
erick 1991). 
Animal welfare is thus left with a serious 
problem. If it sticks to what is scientifically ob- 
servable, it leaves out what distinguishes for 
many people the study of "welfare" from the 
study of physical health, namely, conscious ex- 
periences of suffering and well-being. On the 
other hand, if it accepts that conscious experi- 
ences (such as those humans call fear, pain 
and frustration) are also sensed by other spe- 
cies, it runs headlong into the problem of 
studying conscious experiences that no field 
of science, despite many attempts, has yet 
come to grips with. 
The third type of question that can be asked 
about animal welfare arises out of a concern 
for animal suffering, but is logically distinct 
from the issue of whether animals suffer 
(Stafleu et al. 1996; Fraser et al. 1997). Is it 
ethically right or wrong to treat animals in cer- 
tain ways? Tannenbaum (1991) argued that 
scientific studies of animal welfare can never 
be undertaken separately from an ethical frame- 
work. Rollin (1995) even argues that it is a 
waste of time to ask whether an animal is suf- 
fering, and the onlyjustifiable approach is al- 
ways to work toward reducing suffering. "Ani- 
mal welfare" is therefore put into the same 
category as "public health": it is assumed to 
be a goal toward which everyone should be 
working. The view I shall take here is that mix- 
ing ethical questions about how animals ought 
to be treated with factual questions about wel- 
fare is likely to lead to confusion, since hu- 
mans do not automatically know what condi- 
tions are best for the welfare of animals. Facts 
alone, without preconceived moral views, 
could lead humans to take a different view of 
how animals ought to be treated (Dawkins 
1980). In any case, the general view that scien- 
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tific and ethical questions (what "is" and what 
"ought to be") are different and should not be 
confused, has much to be said for it (Broom 
andJohnson 1993). 
I propose, therefore, to keep these three 
types of questions-the symptoms of good and 
poor welfare, the conscious experience of suf- 
fering, and our ethical attitudes toward ani- 
mals-in their own reasonably watertight 
compartments. Here I shall concentrate on 
the first question, by describing the various in- 
dicators and symptoms of animal welfare that 
are now in use, and how they should be seen 
in an evolutionary context. I shall then briefly 
examine the connection between what we can 
observe and what perhaps can infer about 
conscious experiences in other species. The 
moral implications of welfare studies I shall 
leave firmly alone, allowing readers to decide 
for themselves what they should do with the 
facts that are now available. 
MEASURING WELFARE IN ANIMALS 
The two big challenges in the measurement 
of animal welfare have been to define what is 
meant by welfare, and to decide how to mea- 
sure it (e.g., Dawkins 1980; Curtis 1987; Gon- 
you 1993; Mason and Mendl 1993; Moberg 
1993). In fact, the pursuit of "measures of wel- 
fare" has become something of a Holy Grail. 
As Fraser (1995) has pointed out, however, 
many of the difficulties in defining and mea- 
suring welfare have arisen because of mistaken 
notions about the "welfare" concept. It is not 
a simple variable, like the height of building, 
that can be easily measured in meters or feet. 
On the contrary, it is a complex attribute, 
more like the "safety" of a building rather than 
its height.Just as we do not expect to be able to 
measure the safety of a building by some single 
quantitative expression that will be valid in all 
respects and under all circumstances, so we 
should not expect to arrive at a measure of 
welfare except as a trait having multiple attri- 
butes and being different under various cir- 
cumstances. 
While it is now generally recognized that no 
single measure of welfare is adequate on its 
own (Dawkins 1980; Mason and Mendl 1993), 
there is still disagreement on how different 
measures should be put together and which 
ones should be given priority, and there is a 
persistent tendency to believe that a good 
measure of welfare (with multiple attributes if 
necessary) is attainable if we only knew how to 
construct it. In this section, I shall first review 
the main component measures of animal wel- 
fare that are currently in use. I will emphasize 
the strengths and weaknesses of each, as well 
as the importance of taking a broad view of 
what constitutes good welfare. I shall then argue, 
however, that the goal of animal welfare stud- 
ies should not be to put the various constituent 
parts into a single measure, or to assign various 
values to different measures and then add them 
up to arrive at a total welfare score. Rather, I 
shall argue that many of the so-called symp- 
toms of poor welfare are in fact evolutionary 
adaptations, that is, defenses against threats to 
fitness. Some defenses (such as pain and fear) 
are "unpleasant by design" (Nesse and Williams 
1995:26) in the sense that they temporarily re- 
duce well-being but enhance health and re- 
production in the long term. Such a viewpoint 
has a profound effect on what we should con- 
clude about the welfare of an animal. 
GOOD AND POOR WELFARE 
Injury, disease and death are the obvious 
veterinary symptoms of poor welfare. A wide- 
spread consensus both within and outside 
biology is that good welfare, at the very least, 
means that animals are free from debilitating 
diseases, injury and malnutrition, and that 
they are not kept in conditions that lead to the 
development of physical deformities (Wolfen- 
sohn and Lloyd 1994; Fraser 1995). Some- 
times the first signs of poor welfare are de- 
tected intuitively by a pet owner or a livestock 
owner, or can be assessed quantitatively by 
looking at such indicators as posture, body 
weight, or whether the eyes are open (Morton 
and Griffiths 1985). At other times, injuries or 
deformities may be apparent only after death, 
as with bone breakages (Gregory and Wilkins 
1989) or some skeletal asymmetries (M0ller 
et al. 1995). There are often good practical 
reasons for making sure that symptoms of dis- 
ease and injury are alleviated or avoided: ani- 
mals kept in conditions where they are subject 
to infections or injuries are more likely to die, 
and thus fail to produce the meat, eggs or milk 
that are commercially valuable. But it should 
not be assumed that commercial pressures will 
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always lead to the avoidance of even these 
gross measures of poor welfare. The produc- 
tivity of a farm that produces eggs may be 
greater if birds are kept under conditions in 
which some of them were injured rather than 
if conditions were improved (at some consid- 
erable expense) so that injury rates were 
lower. Such gross welfare measures should be 
made at the level of the individual animal, not 
the farm unit. We should not assume that a 
productive farm is one where the welfare of 
animals is guaranteed. 
Disease, injury and other clinical signs of ill- 
health are indicators of poor welfare for two 
reasons. First, they show that the animal is 
more likely to die. Second, they indicate that 
the animal's own defense mechanisms may have 
been activated, and these may be extremely un- 
pleasant in their own right. For example, it is 
now widely accepted that pain serves a num- 
ber of important functions including the 
avoidance of dangerous situations and simply 
keeping damaged limbs immobile while they 
heal (Wall 1979; Bateson 1991). This means 
that an injured animal has reduced welfare 
both because its injury makes death more 
likely (through infection and vulnerability to 
predation) and also because its adaptive mecha- 
nisms for dealing with injury (making death 
somewhat less likely in the long term) include 
highly unpleasant sensations of pain. Pain 
evolved because, by being unpleasant, it keeps 
us away from the larger evolutionary disaster 
of death. Pain is part of a mechanism for help- 
ing us to avoid immediate sources of injury, and 
also to refrain from repeating actions that 
have resulted in damage. 
This distinction between poor welfare due 
to injury and disease per se, and poor welfare 
owing to the animal's own mechanisms for 
dealing with injury and disease, has important 
implications for assessing the welfare of ani- 
mals that are free of disease, uninjured and, in 
the opinion of a veterinarian, in good health. 
One view is that such animals must be in a state 
of very good welfare indeed, and could not pos- 
sibly be suffering. The other view is that they 
could be suffering if their defense mechanisms 
for avoiding disease and injury had already 
been activated. For example, although pain 
results when an injury occurs, fear is also one 
of the injury-avoiding mechanisms that ani- 
mals have evolved; it comes into play before a 
physical injury happens. In fact, by causing an 
animal to flee or hide, fear probably evolved 
and reduced the likelihood of physical injury 
occurring at all. Just as pain helps to avoid 
death, fear helps to avoid pain. Natural selec- 
tion has led to mechanisms that operate ear- 
lier and earlier, long before health and fitness 
are actually threatened. Thus these unpleasant- 
by-design, death-avoiding mechanisms come 
into play notjust when death is imminent, but 
sometimes long before death is likely to occur. 
In other words, there may be preclinical or 
subclinical changes in response to a potential 
threat, even when the health of the animal is 
apparently good. It is therefore important to 
consider other measures of welfare besides the 
obvious ones of overt disease and injury, even 
though these are generally considered to be the 
cornerstone of all good welfare assessment. 
BEHAVING "NATURALLY 
Over 30 years ago, Thorpe (1965, 1969) ar- 
gued that the ability to perform natural pat- 
terns of behavior was an important criterion of 
welfare. He believed that preventing animals 
from carrying out their "natural instinctive 
urges" (1965:79) inevitably led to poor wel- 
fare. For example, small bare cages that do not 
allow chickens to scratch, dustbathe or show 
other behavior patterns that they normally 
would in "natural" systems were, he argued, 
inevitably detrimental to welfare. 
The idea that the welfare of animals can be 
judged by the extent to which they are able 
to perform their natural behavior patterns is 
widespread (e.g., Kiley-Worthington 1989). It 
has become written into the legislation of vari- 
ous countries. For example, in Germany, the 
Animal Protection Act (1972) required that 
anyone keeping an anitnal should "provide ac- 
commodation which takes into account its 
natural behavior." The U.K. Farm Animal Wel- 
fare Council has stressed the importance of 
the "Five Freedoms," which include the free- 
dom to express normal behavior. The current 
enthusiasm for "environmental enrichment" 
programs in zoos (Markowitz 1982; Carlstead 
1996) rests on the assumption that the more 
of its natural behavior patterns an animal is 
allowed to show, the better its welfare must be. 
Although humans may like to see animals 
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behaving in natural ways, it is important to ask 
whether the animal's welfare is genuinely im- 
proved by such supposed enrichment. When 
we think critically about this issue, it becomes 
clear that there is no necessary connection be- 
tween the naturalness of behavior and good 
welfare. For example, domestic and zoo ani- 
mals show on average less escape and anti- 
predator behavior than wild ones, but it would 
be incorrect to argue from this that the welfare 
of captive animals therefore must be lower be- 
cause of the "deprivation" of not having to flee 
from predators (Dawkins 1980; Baxter 1983). 
If this were true, then environmental enrich- 
ment programs should include a regimen of 
frightening them by exposing them to their 
predators. On the other hand, it could equally 
well be argued that the welfare of captive ani- 
mals is actually better than that of their wild 
counterparts, since the protection offered by 
captivity and the domestic environment means 
that they are less likely to experience fear, or 
injuries that might be sustained by escaping 
from a predator's attack. In order to settle the 
issue one way or the other, we need more evi- 
dence. The naturalness of an animal's behav- 
ior is no guarantee of either good or bad wel- 
fare. At most, a comparison of the behavior of 
a captive animal with that of its wild counter- 
parts can only alert us to the possibility that 
poor welfare may result from inability to per- 
form certain behaviors. 
There is no simple link between "depriva- 
tion" of a natural behavior and welfare be- 
cause various behavior patterns are controlled 
in different ways, which means that there will 
be a variety of results when captive animals are 
prevented from performing behaviors seen in 
wild animals. There is an important distinc- 
tion between the two ways that behavior can 
be brought to an endpoint. 
In some cases, a whole sequence of be- 
haviors can be terminated when an animal 
achieves a particular goal or endpoint. For 
example, female great golden digger wasps 
(Sphex ichneumoneus) dig burrows in which 
they lay their eggs. Each burrow consists of a 
main shaft (which the wasp digs first) with a 
lower side tunnel that branches off. Brock- 
mann (1980) showed that, if she artificially 
lengthened the main shaft in the early stages 
of construction so that it was much deeper 
than the wasp had dug herself, the wasp would 
switch to digging the side tunnel much sooner. 
In other words, it was the end result-in this 
case a shaft of a certain length-that was im- 
portant, not whether the wasp had performed 
a certain amount of digging behavior. There 
are other cases, however, such as nest building 
in hens, where behavior seems to be much less 
controlled by endpoint and much more af- 
fected by performance. Hughes et al. (1989) 
gave hens either preformed nests (previously 
built by the same hen) or flat litter surfaces. 
Nest-building behavior was not inhibited by a 
nest already built, and the hens went through 
nest-building behavior even though a nest was 
already present. Nest building thus seems to 
be an example of where the "behavior itself is 
a potent source of reinforcing stimuli" (Herrn- 
stein 1977). 
Unfortunately, there are no general rules 
for predicting whether a given behavior pat- 
tern per sewill be important to the captive ani- 
mal or rendered unnecessary by providing the 
right environmental stimuli; therefore, there 
is no way, without doing specific experiments, 
of inferring what the results will be in a captive 
animal that does not demonstrate those be- 
haviors. In nature, functional results (such as 
replenishing food reserves, building nests, find- 
ingwater) can be achieved by a variety of mecha- 
nisms. If, in nature, a given species chases its 
prey for a long distance before eating it, there 
is no a priori way of knowing whether the ani- 
mal is motivated to chase even when provided 
with adequate food. Behavioral ecologists have 
been much more concerned with functional 
considerations of what animals do and much 
less concerned with the mechanisms by which 
they achieve them. We are in great need of 
a return to the ethological balance of asking 
questions about both function and mecha- 
nism (Tinbergen 1963), as well as seeing the 
connections between them but realizing that 
they need different sorts of answers (Duncan 
1995). The actual mechanism by which a be- 
havioral sequence is controlled, and conse- 
quently the effects of keeping an animal in 
conditions where it cannot perform the behav- 
ior, are only discoverable by empirical tests. 
Only when we understand the mechanism of 
control and the behavioral and physiological 
consequences that result from animals being 
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prevented from carrying out such behavior 
will we be able to decide whether departures 
from what is natural are good or bad for an 
animal's welfare. This will probably be a rather 
painstaking and in some ways tedious task, as 
the same questions will have to be asked about 
different species and about different behav- 
iors within the same species. 
Such considerations of "deprivation" and 
welfare in nonhuman animals also apply to 
our own species of course. We live unnatural 
lives in the sense that we fail to show many 
former behaviors in what has come to be called 
the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" 
or EEA (Nesse and Williams 1995). Some of 
these "deprivations" (such as too little exer- 
cise) result in poor welfare, whereas others (such 
as better temperature control in our environ- 
ments) have enhanced welfare. Taken alone, 
the degree of unnaturalness in our lives is a 
poor guide to the assessment of our own wel- 
fare. We need other criteria to help in that de- 
cision, both for ourselves and for other species. 
LONGEVITY, REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS 
AND FITNESS 
One solution that has been proposed to the 
problem of whether an animal's welfare is ad- 
versely affected by being unable to perform 
certain kinds of behavior is to measure its lon- 
gevity. Hurnik (1993) has argued that not only 
can longevity be objectively quantified but it 
is also a direct readout of an animal's welfare, 
since it will be a measure of howwell its various 
biological "needs" have been satisfied. He ar- 
gues that the more adequately its needs are 
satisfied, the greater its welfare and the longer 
the animal may be expected to live. 
The main problem with this approach is 
that, as Fraser and Broom (1990), Fraser (1995) 
and others have pointed out, animals have 
been selected to reproduce, not just to live a 
long time as individuals. A consequence of 
gene level selection is that the health, longev- 
ity and even survival of individual animals may 
be reduced in the interests of gene propaga- 
tion. Avery obvious example of this is the con- 
siderable costs, including reduction in physi- 
cal health, that occur in animals during the 
breeding season. Not only do male animals of- 
ten sustain serious injuries by fighting and loss 
of conditioning through failing to feed (e.g., 
Clutton-Brock et al. 1982), they may also suffer 
depression of their immune function as a re- 
sult of the high levels of testosterone (Gross- 
man 1985; McCruden and Stimson 1991). Fe- 
male junglefowl lose up to 17% of their body 
weight while incubating eggs. Normally, such 
a weight loss would be viewed as a deteriora- 
tion of physical health and a decline in wel- 
fare. The birds, however, appear to have been 
selected to be anorexic during this period, 
since they do not eat even if offered food while 
sitting on the nest (Sherry et al. 1980). 
The fact that individual animals may choose 
to sacrifice their own welfare (asjudged by sus- 
ceptibility to disease, injury, and failure to per- 
form individually essential behavior such as 
feeding) means that longevity of the individ- 
ual may not be the most reliable criterion of 
overall welfare. This in turn might suggest that 
the welfare of animals should be judged by 
their reproductive success-a conclusion that 
would obviously find favor with farmers who 
seek high egg production or large litters of 
piglets-or their fitness (Broom andJohnson 
1993). But even this conclusion could be in 
error. Selection does not necessarily favor maxi- 
mal reproduction or even reproduction at all, 
as is shown by the sterile workers found in eu- 
social insects and naked mole rats (Jarvis et al. 
1994) as well as delayed reproduction in many 
bird species (e.g., Emlen and Wrege 1989). 
Furthermore, while loss of fitness may be 
a useful measure in conservation, such as in 
judging adverse effects of tourism on wild pop- 
ulations (Hofer and East 1998), it could be 
positively misleading in the more artificial en- 
vironment of a commercial farm. Here "fit- 
ness," as defined by reproductive success, could 
be the result of selective breeding (or genetic 
modification) that is quite incompatible with 
good welfare. For example, a cockerel of a 
broiler breed might sire a large number of off- 
spring and thus be said to have higher fitness 
than a barnyard cock with a much smaller 
number of surviving offspring. It does not fol- 
low, however, that the broiler cock, kept per- 
manently on low light and restricted food, was 
in a better state of welfare, because the large 
number of offspring could have been achieved 
despite its compromised health. In an ex- 
treme case, an unhealthy bird could have been 
stripped of sperm and its large number of off- 
spring attained by artificial insemination. 
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Once again, although we have a measure- 
ment we can use, additional criteria re needed 
before we can draw valid conclusions about 
welfare. One of the most widely used, most 
quoted and most misunderstood are a suite 
of physiological variables collectively known as 
"stress" symptoms. 
STRESS: PHYSIOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS 
OF POOR WELFARE 
Even before overt signs of disease, injury or 
physical deformity are noted, it may be possi- 
ble to detect internal signs of disturbance of 
metabolism that, if allowed to continue un- 
checked, might lead to visible symptoms of ill 
health that are generally agreed to indicate 
poor welfare (Moberg 1987). Animal welfare 
studies would thereby have the same objective 
basis as veterinary medicine, but with the 
added bonus that since it is concerned with 
subclinical or preclinical signs of ill health, the 
welfare of even apparently healthy animals 
can be assessed. Two major problems remain 
for such a "litmus test" of animal welfare: what 
physiological variables should be used, and 
what level of a given variable should corre- 
spond with suffering or otherwise give rise to 
concern for the animal's welfare. 
The first of these problems-the physiolog- 
ical variables to look for-has largely been 
tackled by referring to a suite of so-called 
"stress" symptoms. Unfortunately, there has 
been a great deal of confusion both about the 
meaning of stress and about the interpreta- 
tion of the variables that are supposed to re- 
flect its presence (Archer 1979; Rushen 1991; 
Broom andJohnson 1993; Moberg 1993; Weip- 
kema and Koolhaas 1993; Sapolsky 1994; 
Toates 1995). Originally the term was applied 
to the group of adaptive responses that many 
animals show when faced with a situation re- 
quiring some sort of immediate action, such 
as fleeing from a predator or fighting off a rival 
(Cannon 1929). Some of these responses, such 
as deeper breathing and increased heart rate, 
obviously prepare the animal for an action to 
come by delivering oxygen more quickly to 
the tissues that need it. Others, particularly 
the activation of the HPA (hypothalamic-pitu- 
itary-adrenocortical) system involve cortico- 
steroid hormones that affect the metabolism 
of glucose, both by lowering its transport into 
cells and by inhibiting production of insulin. 
As a consequence, the amount of plasma glu- 
cose is increased providing immediately avail- 
able energy. This energy helps prepare the 
body for fast and possibly prolonged action, 
such as fighting or fleeing from a predator. 
Selye (1956) called this whole set of symptoms 
the GAS or General Adaptation Syndrome, 
and he believed that one of the very striking 
things about it was that the reactions of the 
body were very similar when exposed to a wide 
range of different stimuli such as electric 
shock, cold or injury. In Selye's view, "stres- 
sors" were stimuli that could be demonstrated 
to trigger this syndrome. "Stress" symptoms, 
and in particular a rise in glucocorticoid lev- 
els, were thought to be a clear indication of a 
wide range of unpleasant or aversive states, 
and thus of great importance in the assess- 
ment of animal welfare (Barnett and Hems- 
worth 1990; Broom andJohnson 1993). 
A number of serious conceptual and factual 
problems, however, have subsequently arisen 
that cast doubt on the universality of glucocor- 
ticoids as "stress" hormones and thus mea- 
sures of poor welfare. The stress response to 
different so-called stressors may not be as simi- 
lar as once thought, the apparent similarity 
resulting from a common reaction to being 
tested and handled (Dantzer and Mormede 
1983; Moberg 1993; Rushen and De Passille 
1992). Even more serious, higher glucocorti- 
coid levels (as well as increased heart rate and 
other symptoms of stress) occur in situations 
that could be considered very pleasurable, 
such as during sexual behavior, feeding behav- 
ior or anticipation of food (Szechtman et al. 
1974; Colborn et al. 1991). 
This generality of the stress response ob- 
served in situations regarded either as pleas- 
ant or as unpleasant has caused much con- 
fusion. Despite many attempts to strip the 
stress response of its negative connotations, 
such as Selye giving one of his books the title 
Stress without Distress (1974), the word stress in 
popular usage continues to imply something 
unpleasant, damaging and definitely to be 
avoided if at all possible. A more neutral word 
such as "arousal," "excitement" or "physiologi- 
cal activation" would not bias an answer to the 
question of whether a particular instance of 
the GAS was positive or negative, but when 
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corticosteroids are labeled "stress" hormones, 
many immediately are led without thinking to 
the conclusion that if some activity causes a 
rise in "stress hormones" it must, by definition, 
be bad for the animal's welfare. Indeed Broom 
(1991), in discussing elevated corticosteroid 
secretion in domestic animals that are han- 
dled, argues that "a greater response indicates 
poorer welfare than a smaller response." 
Recently, even more confusion has crept 
into the literature. The word "stress" has been 
used to cover not only physiological responses 
involving increased glucocorticoid secretion 
but also any negative effect whether it is medi- 
ated through corticosteroids or not. Thus, in 
a variety of animals, it has now been shown 
that symmetrical individuals are more attrac- 
tive as mates than ones that are asymmetrical 
(M0ller and Swaddle 1997). Symmetry, such 
as shown by the ability to grow two horns or 
two tail feathers of the same length, is believed 
to be an indicator of mate quality because sym- 
metry is difficult o achieve in the face of per- 
turbations in the environment (Parsons 1990). 
Animals that have enough resources to achieve 
symmetry are thus thought to be of higher 
quality. Perturbations that can potentially dis- 
rupt developmental processes are unfortu- 
nately referred to as "stressors," even though 
there may be no evidence that corticosteroids 
are involved at all. 
The inexorable (but misleading) logic 
about stress now goes like this: Stress was origi- 
nally defined as any factor which leads to in- 
creased corticosteroid secretion. In popular 
thinking, however, stress implies something 
unpleasant and bad forwelfare. Therefore any 
increase in corticosteroid levels must be bad 
for welfare and that in turn must be stressful, 
regardless of whether it leads to increased cor- 
ticosteroid levels. Put in this light, it is easy to 
see that the confusion about the word "stress" 
is considerable and is made up of several dif- 
ferent sources of error. 
The solution that Toates (1995) proposes is 
not to abandon the concept of stress alto- 
gether, but to refine the definition in such a 
way that elevated corticosteroids becomes a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
calling something a stressor. The extra ele- 
ment he proposes is that elevated corticoster- 
oid levels should be shown to occur in condi- 
tions that the animal finds aversive (and will 
attempt to avoid), thus giving a critical role to 
the animal's own response to the situation, a 
point we will return to later. 
The advantage of this viewpoint is that it 
allows us to get around the realization that 
highly pleasurable situations can also give rise 
to elevated corticosteroid levels (a kiss is not 
stressful; the presence of a predator is). The 
disadvantage is that the word "stress" has now 
become so widely used in situations where no 
one has even looked for corticosteroids (such 
as in many current studies on fluctuating asym- 
metry) that even this understanding may not 
be enough to stem the tide of confusion. Fur- 
thermore, an evolutionary approach to the way 
animals respond to potentially damaging situa- 
tions gives us yet another reason why "stress," 
even when restricted to demonstrably aversive 
situations in which there is known to be a rise 
in corticosteroid levels, may not be the best 
or most useful way to forge the link between 
physiology and measures of poor welfare. 
Even a very simplistic Darwinian starting 
point would lead us to expect that animals 
would behave and respond physiologically in 
adaptive ways in the face of threats to their 
survival and reproduction. But it would be ex- 
tremely implausible to suggest that all such 
threats would be met in the same way. For ex- 
ample, if an animal's life and well-being are 
being put at risk by dehydration, we would not 
expect it to respond in the same way as if it 
were threatened by an approaching predator 
or to the danger resulting from having a bro- 
ken limb. Seeking water, running away from a 
predator, or remaining immobile to prevent 
further damage to an injury are all adaptive 
responses, but it is clear that they are all differ- 
ent. Some animals respond to predator attack 
by fleeing, others by freezing and remaining 
motionless. It is therefore not surprising to 
find that the physiological responses that ac- 
company and give rise to these disparate be- 
haviors would also be different (Freeman 
1985). The fact that the physiological "stress" 
response occurs after such a wide variety of 
different stimuli, such as injury, cold, and dis- 
ease, is quite remarkable. 
But the fact that some diverse stimuli give 
rise to a common "stress" syndrome does not 
necessarily mean that all threats to survival will 
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do so. We must go back to the considerations 
of why the "stress" response occurs at all. As 
we have previously seen, stress prepares the 
body for action by making it ready for "flight 
or fight." It follows that threats to the animal 
that are not met most adaptively by intense 
activity might not be accompanied by a "stress" 
response at all, yet could still be highly aversive 
to the animal. Indeed, we find some animals 
that respond to predators by remaining immo- 
bile do not show the "stress" response. They 
do not need the increased energy that gluco- 
corticoids provide and a pounding heart might 
actually make them less immobile and thus 
more in danger of being spotted (Gabrielsson 
et al. 1977). 
A similar argument holds between different 
threats posed to the same animal. If the wel- 
fare of an animal is threatened by a predator, 
it may well need to prepare for action, but not 
if its welfare is being compromised by a lack 
of stimulation. For this reason, simple com- 
parisons between levels of corticosteroid hor- 
mones in two situations can be extremely un- 
reliable guides to the welfare of animals. In 
laying hens, a comparison is sometimes made 
between caged birds and those kept in larger 
groups or range freely. The threats to free- 
range birds (predators, interactions with large 
groups of other birds), however, are quite dif- 
ferent from those of caged birds where lack of 
freedom to turn or the absence of nest boxes 
could be expected to give rise to a different 
set of physiological and behavioral responses. 
Any simple conclusion based onjust one phys- 
iological stress variable is therefore bound to 
be suspect. 
There is another evolutionary reason why 
we should expect "stress hormone" levels to 
be an unreliable guide to welfare: There is a 
great deal of overlap between physiological re- 
sponses to pleasurable and aversive situations. 
Preparation for action is as characteristic of 
many pleasurable responses as it is of aversive 
ones. Both the prey that runs away from its 
predator and the predator that runs after it in 
anticipation of something to eat have to make 
a major physical effort and to mobilize their 
resources to do so. It is therefore not surpris- 
ing that many of the "stress" symptoms we see 
in animals attempting to get away from aver- 
sive situations are also present in animals ac- 
tively engaged in pleasurable situations. Ani- 
mals seek out and move towards food, water, 
mates or a comfortable nest, and they use the 
same limbs and muscles to achieve those goals 
as they do to avoid threatening situations, and 
they may do so just as actively. It is therefore 
to be expected that positive reinforcement of 
sexual activity will have symptoms, including 
increased heart rate and raised corticosteroid 
levels, similar to those induced by aversive or 
punishing stimuli. 
Increased corticosteroid levels are thus not 
necessarily indicative of negative emotional 
states or poor welfare, but of more general 
states of excitement that can be either pleas- 
ant or very unpleasant indeed. The only differ- 
ence between states we refer to as good welfare 
and poor welfare may be whether the animal 
actively attempts to go toward or away from 
something, that is, whether the animal finds a 
situation aversive or punishing. This in turn 
may be reflected physiologically only in mi- 
nute brain differences between the two states. 
Agony and ecstasy may be similar except for a 
small crucial difference that may be very diffi- 
cult to detect. What have been described as 
physiological measures of stress tend to be mea- 
surements of preparation for action, whereas 
what we really need to know is whether the 
decision-making mechanisms of an animal 
have evaluated the situation as aversive or 
pleasurable. Until we have a better developed 
physiology of decision and choice in animals, 
we will need to supplement our physiological 
measures with behavioral measures of aver- 
sion (see next section on behavior and ani- 
mal welfare). 
In addition to this difficulty of relying only 
on corticosteroids, there are other practical 
problems that have beset studies on "stress" 
responses. Rushen (1991) documents a num- 
ber of studies that actually describe com- 
pletely contradictory results. Corticosteroid 
levels in laying hens have been reported as be- 
ing higher in cages than in pens (Gibson et al. 
1986), lower in cages than in pens (Koelke- 
beck et al. 1987), the same (Craig et al. 1986) or 
dependent on the level of handling (Mench 
et al. 1986). Since quite different conclusions 
can be drawn about the relative welfare of 
birds kept in cages or in pens, depending on 
which study is cited, it is extremely important 
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to know how such apparent contradictions 
arise. Some answers are not hard to find. Few 
studies report the effects of handling on birds 
whose blood is taken for sampling, and do not 
even state how long after being caught (itself 
a potential stressor) the blood samples were 
taken. As handling affects corticosteroid levels 
in the blood, it is clear that this is potentially 
a major source of error. There is a natural rise 
and fall in hormone levels that take place after 
a stressful stimulus has been applied (Wing- 
field et al. 1997) which is often not taken into 
account when measuring changes in cortico- 
steroid levels after exposure to environmen- 
tal stimuli. 
This is not meant to imply that physiological 
measurements are unimportant. But it does 
mean that, in choosing which physiological 
variables to use to measure poor welfare, we 
should not rely too heavily on those that hap- 
pen to have been labeled "stress hormones," 
as they may not be as specific to states of un- 
pleasant motivation as we might have thought. 
Relying on conventional measures of stress 
without corroborative behavioral evidence 
that the animal is not merely excited at the 
anticipation of pleasurable experience can be, 
and indeed has been, very misleading. 
Apart from glucocorticoids and their repu- 
tation as "stress hormones," a number of other 
physiological measurements have been used 
to assess welfare. These include hormones such 
as prolactin and luteinizing hormone, natu- 
rally occurring opioids such as 3-endorphins, 
as well as changes in neurotransmitters uch 
as dopamine and noradrenaline (for reviews 
see Broom and Johnson 1993 and Toates 
1995). Particular interest has recently cen- 
tered on evidence that skeletal or heart muscle 
has been damaged as a result of overexertion. 
Bateson and Bradshaw (1997) used a variety 
of measures to argue that red deer (Cervus ela- 
phus) in the U.K. are in a state of physiological 
exhaustion and show evidence of muscle dam- 
age after being hunted with hounds, com- 
pared to nonhunted deer that had been shot 
with rifles. In a typical deer hunt, the animals 
are chased for nearly 20 km, after which their 
levels of plasma hemoglobin are consistent 
with considerable intravascular hemolysis that 
is much more severe than that associated with 
"normal" exercise in this species. Creatine ki- 
nase and other enzymes also showed much 
higher levels in chased deer than in those that 
were shot. These major differences led Bate- 
son and Bradshaw to conclude that deer hunt- 
ing with hounds causes considerable suffer- 
ing. As a result of this conclusion, the National 
Trust (a major landowner in Britain) decided 
to ban deer hunting on its land because of 
animal welfare considerations. 
Suppressed functioning of the immune sys- 
tem has also been suggested as an important 
physiological indicator of welfare since it is 
so directly related to susceptibility to disease 
which, as we have already seen, is a universally 
acknowledged measure of poorwelfare. More- 
over, suppression of immune responses seems 
to be affected by glucocorticoids, natural opi- 
oids and other aspects of the physiological 
stress response (Sapolsky 1994; Toates 1995). 
In humans, there appears to be a demonstrated 
link between stressful ife events, immunosup- 
pression and disease, such as in the case of 
increased susceptibility to colds (Andersen et 
al. 1994). In mice, too, social status and hor- 
monal state affect susceptibility to disease (Bar- 
nard et al. 1993). 
There are very complex and reciprocal in- 
teractions among the nervous, endocrine and 
immune systems (Maier et al. 1994). The in- 
terpretation in terms of animal welfare is even 
further complicated because sex hormones, 
particularly testosterone, also suppress the im- 
mune system. Thus many male animals have 
an increased susceptibility to diseases and par- 
asites during the breeding season as quite a 
natural part of their life cycle. Indeed, one cur- 
rent theory of mate choice relies on the as- 
sumption that the immune function in breed- 
ing males is inevitably compromised, and that 
females choose males that are able to over- 
come this "handicap" (Folstad and Karter 1992). 
Once again, we are cautioned about conclud- 
ing too much from a single physiological mea- 
surement. 
It is clear, then, because of the many and 
complex ways in which physiological factors 
prepare the animal to respond to threats, that 
it is very difficult o state which ones reliably 
and definitively correlate with states of suffer- 
ing or pain that indicate poor welfare. That is 
not to say, when the studies have been done, 
that a physiological variable might not turn 
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out to be extremely useful in the assessment 
of welfare; but our confidence that it can be 
used as such depends on extensive work that 
demonstrates its exclusivity to aversive situa- 
tions, as shown by the behavior. Nor should 
we necessarily expect any one physiological 
variable to be seen in all situations that ani- 
mals find aversive. Given that animals respond 
differently to various threats, we may have to 
be satisfied with a range of different variables, 
each specific to a particular aversive situation. 
One set of physiological variables may be good 
measures of suffering caused by exhaustion as 
a result of a deer being chased by dogs over 
a period of a few hours, but quite different 
measures may be appropriate for suffering 
caused by a bird being deprived of food or a 
farm animal being kept on a bare slatted floor 
for many weeks. 
The second difficultywith using physiological 
measurements is knowing what level of a given 
physiological variable should be considered to 
indicate poor welfare. Even if one supposes 
that corticosteroid hormones are the appro- 
priate variable to use for assessing a situation 
that the animals found aversive, we would still 
need to know how high the levels would have 
to rise before we could conclude that the ani- 
mal's welfare was being adversely affected. As 
we have seen, corticosteroids are an important 
and adaptive part of the body's natural defenses 
against certain dangers, so that we should not 
conclude that any rise was necessarily indica- 
tive of poor welfare. But how much of a rise 
would be indicative? 
This is essentially the same dilemma en- 
countered by Nesse and Williams (1995), who 
try to distinguish between responses that the 
body makes to disease that are essentially de- 
fense mechanisms (such as fever and pain) 
and those that are defects (such as jaundice 
and ulcers). They argue that our bodies have 
evolved adaptive defense mechanisms, such as 
raising the body temperature when chal- 
lenged by disease organisms, because this pro- 
vides an unfavorable environment for those 
organisms. A fever is unpleasant for us but 
damaging to bacteria and viruses. Feeling ill 
and taking to our beds may be adaptive be- 
cause it forces us to rest and thus hasten recov- 
ery. Although we may feel better temporarily 
if we take aspirin, reduce our fever, and carry 
on normally, we may in the long run take 
longer to recover, and in this sense reduce our 
welfare. On the other hand, there will be other 
symptoms, such as ulcers, which are nonadap- 
tive and a sign that the body's defense mecha- 
nisms have broken down. Here finding ways 
to reduce pain may be the best thing to do. 
Since the body may not be able to repair itself, 
taking steps to make ourselves feel better by 
reducing our suffering is more likely to lead 
to a full recovery sooner. 
The problem is that although both cases in- 
volve unpleasant feelings of illness and pain, 
in the first instance these indicate that adap- 
tive defenses are at work, whereas in the sec- 
ond they are a sign that the defense mecha- 
nisms have broken down. Natural defense 
mechanisms that are "unpleasant by design" 
for adaptive reasons may outwardly appear 
and inwardly feel the same as those of a defen- 
sive breakdown. So where should the line be 
drawn? How much in the way of natural de- 
fense mechanisms (e.g., a rise in heart rate or 
corticosteroid levels) should be seen as com- 
patible with good health and welfare? Where, 
in other words, does unacceptably poor wel- 
fare begin? 
There is, of course, no single answer to this 
(Mendl 1991). The answer to the question of 
whether fever is adaptive in a given instance 
is a purely empirical one: does taking aspirin 
when feeling ill lead to a longer or shorter pe- 
riod of recovery? It is not unlike the question 
of whether depression in humans is a defense 
or a dysfunction: are people who experience 
depression better or worse at making impor- 
tant life decisions (Nesse and Williams 1995)? 
It follows that questions of how much fever 
or how much depression should be tolerated 
before attempts are made to reduce them are 
also empirical ones. We have to discover what 
relationship a given level of malaise has to 
other accepted criteria of welfare, the most ob- 
vious ones being those relating to physical 
health. As we have seen repeatedly, there is no 
way to calibrate what level of a physiological 
variable is compatible with good welfare just 
by considering it in isolation. We need either 
to show that the variable in question relates 
directly to physical health or that it is linked 
to it indirectly via some other pathway. 
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BEHAVIOR AND WELFARE 
Behavior has been used in the assessment 
of animal welfare in two different ways. The 
first is that various kinds of behavior such as 
stereotypies, redirected activities, and vacuum 
activities have been used as indicators of poor 
welfare, somewhat in the same way as physio- 
logical measurements. These behavioral indi- 
cators are subject to the same two difficulties 
that beset physiological measurements, namely, 
deciding which behavior to use and determin- 
ing how much of a given behavior indicates 
"poor welfare." The second way behavior has 
been used is as a more direct readout of how 
an animal responds to a given situation, and 
whether the animal finds it aversive or pleasur- 
able. We have seen in the previous section that 
many of the physiological symptoms that ac- 
company pain and suffering are similar to 
those that accompany pleasure. Since the dis- 
tinction between pain and pleasure is obvi- 
ously critical to the assessment of welfare, the 
behavioral distinction between aversion (that 
is, an animal will work to get away from it) or 
pleasure (an animal will work to gain or con- 
tinue with it) is one of the most critical ones 
that can be made. The animal's own choices 
and preferences are thus seen not merely as 
peripheral and perhaps sentimental luxuries 
that are less important than "objective" mea- 
sures such as stress hormones, but rather as an 
indispensable part of welfare assessment, and 
critical to the correct interpretation of almost 
every other criterion. Below I will outline how 
behavior has been used in this first way, but 
then concentrate on its second and, in my 
view, much more critical role as the key indica- 
tor of pleasure or suffering. 
Behavioral Indicators 
It is assumed that poor welfare often results 
when animals are prevented from expressing 
highly motivated behavior (Dawkins 1988), ei- 
ther because the relevant external stimuli are 
absent or because the confines of a cage physi- 
cally prevent them from doing so. One justifi- 
cation for using a particular behavior as a mea- 
sure of welfare is that it indicates when an 
animal is highly motivated, but frustrated or 
thwarted in its attempts to accomplish a behav- 
ior. Alternatively, even when it might not be 
limited physically, there may be a conflict be- 
tween two strong motivations (e.g., to feed or 
to flee from the presence of a conspecific at 
the food dish), and thus an animal is effec- 
tively excluded from an important activity 
such as feeding. Many behavioral indicators 
of welfare are therefore thought to indicate 
frustration or conflict. For example, Tinber- 
gen (1951) described a category of behavior 
shown by animals when they are in a conflict 
which he called displacement activities-odd or 
irrelevant behavior that appears to have noth- 
ing to do with the conflict at all. A herring 
gull in a conflict between attacking a rival and 
fleeing, may suddenly start pulling up grass, 
thereby engaging in apparently irrelevant 
nest-building behavior in the middle of a fight. 
Since there is considerable evidence that dis- 
placement activities occur in situations of con- 
flict and tension, Maestripieri et al. (1992) 
suggested that such "irrelevant" behaviors 
might have considerable value as indicators of 
emotional conflict. Another indication that 
an animal is highly aroused is when captive 
animals go through complete behavioral se- 
quences even when the usual stimuli eliciting 
such behavior are not present. Hens kept on 
wire-floored cages will go through all the 
movements of dustbathing (Vestergaard 1980) 
even though there is no loose substrate on the 
floor and no dust reaches the feathers. Lorenz 
(1950) called such behavior vacuum activities 
because they are performed "in a vacuum," 
that is, in the absence of any external releasing 
stimuli. To Lorenz and others who accepted 
his energy model of the control of motivation, 
the presence of vacuum activities indicated a 
high level of frustration, and therefore poor 
welfare (e.g., Sambraus 1982). 
Even if it is not strictly correct to say that 
such behavior is elicited in the absence of all 
external stimuli (caged hens often flick food 
onto their heads and thus may gain some stim- 
ulation relevant to dustbathing), it is never- 
theless true that captive animals may perform 
behaviors to apparently reduced levels of ex- 
ternal stimulation. Although this may indicate 
a degree of frustration, it does not follow that 
the animal's welfare is necessarily poor, since 
the performance of a vacuum activity may it- 
self be an adequate substitute for the real 
thing. Pet dogs chase balls, but we do not con- 
clude therefore that their welfare is reduced 
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because they may be deprived of hunting be- 
havior. On the contrary, chasing balls seems 
to be highly reinforcing and generally an ade- 
quate substitute for hunting prey. Once again, 
as with many of the physiological measures dis- 
cussed earlier, the occurrence of substitute or 
vacuum activities in itself does not indicate 
poor welfare. It should alert us to the possibil- 
ity that an animal is highly motivated to behave 
in a certain way but, without further investiga- 
tion of how that behavior is controlled and 
what turns it on and off, that behavior cannot 
lead us to conclude that the welfare of the ani- 
mal has necessarily been compromised. 
Even greater caution should be applied to 
labeling a behavior "abnormal" because it looks 
odd, and then assuming that all abnormal be- 
havior is indicative of poor welfare. Some ab- 
normal behavior, such as self-mutilations (e.g., 
feather plucking in parrots), are clearly an in- 
dication that all is notwell, but not because the 
behavior is abnormal in the sense of "different 
from average" or even "not seen in wild ani- 
mals" (Mason 1991). Rather, it is indicative of 
poor welfare because it results in injury, thus 
anchoring it firmly to the very first criterion 
we considered. Other abnormal behavior (in 
the sense of "away from the norm") may be 
completely compatible with good welfare. For 
example, the behavior of pets towards humans 
(and vice versa) can be extremely abnormal 
without any suggestion that the welfare of ei- 
ther party has been compromised. 
There is, however, one category of abnor- 
mal behavior that has attracted a great deal of 
attention as an important indicator of poor 
welfare. Stereotypies are fixed sequences of be- 
havior performed over and over again in the 
same way with no obvious function (Mason 
1991; Lawrence and Rushen 1993). For exam- 
ple, polar bears and foxes in zoo enclosures 
may stand swaying their heads and necks from 
side to side or may pace around a set route so 
often that they wear away the ground. Sows 
confined in stalls may constantly rub their 
mouths back and forth over the bars, doing 
this so often that they make themselves bleed. 
The term "stereotypy" is in many ways an un- 
fortunate one because it would seem to imply 
the fixed or stereotypic nature of the sequence 
being performed, which would include many 
quite natural sequences such as breathing and 
courtship displays. Indeed, stereotypy has in 
the past been viewed as an evolutionary pres- 
sure on signals to make them less ambiguous 
(Cullen 1966). In the context of animal wel- 
fare, however, the defining feature of a stereo- 
typy is notjust its fixed nature but its apparent 
lack of function. Swaying to and fro or pacing 
round and round a small cage does not 
achieve anything for the animal, and yet it con- 
tinues to do it. 
The causal basis of stereotypies, as well as 
exactly what they indicate about the welfare of 
animals, is a matter of continuing debate. One 
complication is that the early development of 
a stereotypy may be owing to factors different 
from those that maintain it in an adult animal 
(Lawrence and Terlouw 1993; Mason and Tur- 
ner 1993). Hens in small cages may develop 
stereotypic pacing back and forth, apparently 
out of frustrated attempts to escape (Duncan 
and Wood-Gush 1972). Even when let out of 
their cages, however, they may continue to 
show the same stereotyped behavior. So a ster- 
eotypy may not necessarily indicate any cur- 
rent adverse conditions. Rather, it may indi- 
cate that at some time in the past, its welfare 
was compromised and that the animal is still 
affected by that past experience. 
Another problem with the interpretation of 
stereotypies is that they may even help the ani- 
mal cope with its environment, in the same 
way perhaps, that pacing up and down for a 
human sometimes relieves tension. There is 
some suggestion that stereotypies are associ- 
ated with a reduction of some of the physiolog- 
ical symptoms of stress, such as corticosteroid 
levels or heart rate. Cronin et al. (1985) even 
proposed that by performing stereotypies 
such as bar-biting, pigs induce a state of self- 
narcotization through the release of endor- 
phins into the bloodstream. We should not 
conclude, however, that stereotypies maintain 
the physiological balance of the animal and 
thus are no cause for concern. Rather, viewing 
them in an evolutionary context suggests that 
they may be failed attempts on the part of an 
animal to alter its environment in some way. 
For example, behavior such as gnawing, push- 
ing or running may be adaptive in the sense 
that they increase an animal's chances of es- 
cape in many natural situations. In a small cage 
where escape is impossible, however, they may 
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be totally ineffective, and yet repeated over 
and over again by the animal, so that they ap- 
pear to be functionless stereotypies, albeit 
with a functional origin. Repetition of behav- 
ior that does not fulfill its evolutionary role 
is widely believed to indicate poor welfare at 
some stage in the animal's life (Dantzer 1991; 
Broom andJohnson 1993; Mason 1993). 
Still another indication of poor welfare is a 
change in activity levels, that is, changes in an 
animal's movement-either how it carries out 
a behavior or how long it takes to do it. Cattle 
kept on slatted or slippery floors may take up 
to 20 minutes to lie down, whereas they take 
only a few seconds on a nonslippery floor (An- 
dreae and Smidt 1982), strongly suggesting 
considerable discomfort on the slatted floor. 
The unusual gait and general difficulties with 
standing or walking has been noted as an out- 
ward sign of bone abnormalities in intensively 
kept broiler chickens (Wong-Valle et al. 1993) 
and turkeys (Nestor 1984). More positively, 
since play behavior is associated with physical 
health (Fagen 1981; Martin and Caro 1985; 
Bekoff and Byers 1992) it has been suggested 
that the presence of this behavior should be 
taken as a sign of good welfare in captive ani- 
mals, particularly oung ones (Lawrence 1987). 
The idea that an animal's vocalizations might 
provide an indication of its state of welfare is 
an attractive one. Calls are easy to record and 
quantify, and as communication signals they 
may have evolved specially to indicate "need," 
particularly from young animals to their par- 
ents (Godfray 1991). Weary and Fraser (1995) 
showed that what they called nonthriving pig- 
lets (lightweightandlowweightgain) andpig- 
lets that had not been fed for some time gave 
higher frequency calls than those from thriv- 
ing and well-fed piglets. Domestic chicks give 
high-pitched and piercing "distress" calls when 
isolated or cold (Wood-Gush 1971) and the 
ultrasonic calls of rat pups increase when they 
become chilled (Olivier et al. 1994). Weary 
and Fraser therefore suggest that such calls 
can be used as measures of the welfare of a 
particular animal. 
While such vocalizations may be extremely 
valuable as indicators of need in young ani- 
mals, they can be expected to be confined 
mostly to situations where the one calling en- 
deavors to summon the aid of another animal, 
such as an infant calling to its parents, or 
among very highly social animals that aid 
other members of their group. 
During tonic immobility, sometimes called 
animal hypnosis (Eddy and Gallup 1994), ani- 
mals remain absolutely motionless, notably 
when handled. In chickens, it consists of lying 
on their backs in a rigid and frozen position, 
but versions of "frozen" and apparently hyp- 
notized postures are seen in a wide variety of 
animals. It appears to be an antipredator re- 
sponse when an animal is captured, and the 
only defense is to "play dead." The duration 
of tonic immobility-the time from its induc- 
tion to the animal righting itself-has been 
used as a measure of fearfulness (Jones and 
Faure 1981; Vestergaard et al. 1993). 
Many different behavioral indices have 
been proposed and certainly have their uses 
in the assessment of welfare, but they are sub- 
ject to the same two problems that were raised 
in connection with physiological indices- 
namely, that although they may under some 
circumstances indicate that an animal's wel- 
fare has diminished, their interpretation is 
subject to doubt; even where some impair- 
ment of welfare is indicated, it is difficult to 
know how much. Broom andJohnson (1993) 
proposed that if an animal shows stereotypic 
behavior more than 40% of the time, then it 
is suffering, but this figure is somewhat arbi- 
trary. We still need a way of anchoring the be- 
havioral symptoms of aversiveness of a situation 
to the animal, and a framework for deciding 
how the different constituent indicators can 
be linked together. I shall argue that the unify- 
ing framework is the animal's system of prefer- 
ence and choice. 
Choice, Reinforcement and Welfare 
In humans, reduced welfare results from a 
variety of circumstances. Exhaustion from 
overwork, boredom from not enough to do, 
fear from hearing an intruder in the house, 
or prolonged thirst are all unpleasant and, if 
protracted, likely to lead to reduced welfare, 
but they are all different. They result in various 
physiological responses and have diverse be- 
havioral responses as well. About the only 
thing they have in common is they all spur us 
to remove ourselves from those situations, and 
to strive to avoid the same situations in future. 
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In other words, they are all aversive, as demon- 
strated by our reactions. The importance of 
knowing whether an animal, human or non- 
human, shows by its behaviorwhether it finds a 
situation aversive becomes apparent when we 
observe two people riding a roller coaster. Both 
are screaming, both have pounding hearts 
and a rush of adrenaline, but perhaps one has 
been dragged unwillingly onto the ride and is 
genuinely frightened, whereas the other enthu- 
siastically climbed aboard and is enjoying the 
ride greatly. Operationally, we can distinguish 
them by whether they freely choose to have a 
second ride. For the first person, the ride is 
clearly aversive and may have given rise to gen- 
uine suffering. For the second, it provided 
positive reinforcement. It has been suggested 
that similar logic may be used with nonhuman 
animals to distinguish between situations that 
they find pleasurable or reinforcing and those 
that they find aversive (Dawkins 1990). 
There are two issues here. One is how an 
animal's choice and reinforcement mecha- 
nisms are related to health and welfare. The 
second is whether the subjective human expe- 
riences of "suffering" that often accompany 
negative reinforcement or absence of positive 
reinforcement (such as in pain or lack of food) 
are also present in nonhuman animals in aver- 
sive situations. In keeping with my intention 
to separate such questions, I shall here con- 
centrate on the first and postpone discussion 
of the second until later, starting with a view 
of how animal choice and reinforcement 
mechanisms have evolved as part of adaptive 
behavioral strategies. 
Natural selection has led to the evolution of 
some behavioral mechanisms that help ensure 
the survival of the body, while others favor re- 
productive success, even at the risk of the indi- 
vidual's survival. Some of these mechanisms 
are concerned with avoiding damage or injury 
to the bodywhen the danger is already present 
(for example, protecting a limb from likely in- 
jury). Others are concerned with avoidance of 
a situation entirely when damage or injury is 
likely. An example of such avoidance would 
be moving away when a predator appeared on 
a distant hillside, long before a chase was initi- 
ated. Still other avoidance tactics are used 
even earlier in time, such as a preference for 
sleeping during the day in dense vegetation, 
when an animal is hidden from predators alto- 
gether. These are all adaptive explanations. If 
we look at the mechanisms by which such adap- 
tive choices are made, however, we can posit a 
wide variety of possibilities ranging from simple 
fixed rules to a complex moment-to-moment 
evaluation of different outcomes. 
The simplest mechanisms are tropisms and 
taxes in which orientation toward or away 
from a stimulus is achieved by linking recep- 
tors to a response mechanism. Such mecha- 
nisms are found in both animals and plants, 
but they tend to give rise to very fixed responses, 
such as movement toward light or nutrients. 
With many animals, however, natural selec- 
tion has enabled them to respond much more 
flexibly through a system of positive (reward- 
ing) and negative (punishing) reinforcers. Ani- 
mals can learn responses that provide rewarding 
experiences associated with increased fitness, 
but they can also learn negative responses to 
stimuli associated with reduced fitness. The 
important point is that an animal using a sys- 
tem of reinforcers and learned associations 
will, like the simpler animal or plant with its 
tropisms and taxes, be able to avoid predators 
and find food, but will be much more flexible 
because it can try to take a much wider range 
of other responses in case of failure. It will also 
be able to decide between very different courses 
of action by weighing the reward (or punish- 
ment) value of different ones (Rolls 1990). 
For example, the taste of water would provide 
a greater reward for a very thirsty animal than 
a moderately sweet taste to a well-fed one. To 
make sure that rewards are appropriately cho- 
sen, they need to be evaluated on a similar 
scale that will accurately assess the costs and 
benefits of obtaining them at that moment 
(Houston and MacNamara 1988). Reward 
and punishment signals provide a common 
currency for helping an animal decide which 
action to take at a given time (Rolls 1998). 
This has important implications for animal 
welfare because reinforcers may become im- 
portant to the animal, quite apart from their 
fitness consequences. Thus, if seeking cover 
in nature is an important antipredator adapta- 
tion for a small mammal, and hence positively 
reinforcing, then such an animal in a preda- 
tor-free captive environment may find that 
seeking cover is positively reinforcing whereas 
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absence of cover is very aversive, even though 
its fitness in captivity is not increased by seek- 
ing cover. Its welfare could, however, be signif- 
icantly reduced if no cover were provided. In- 
deed, I will go one stage further and argue 
that, apart from overt health problems, most 
of the concerns about animal welfare arise be- 
cause of reinforcement mechanisms-that is, 
animals find some situations highly aversive 
and are unable to fulfill the conditions that are 
specified by their reinforcement mechanisms. 
The evolution of positive and negative rein- 
forcers that allow flexibility of behavior and 
the acquisition of new responses thus has a 
cost: animals may find certain circumstances 
very negatively reinforcing even when their 
health or fitness is not actually threatened. 
The caged animal kept without cover has re- 
duced welfare by being continuously fearful 
even though its welfare (as judged by health 
and fitness prospects) are good. The means 
of increasing fitness in the wild (through fear 
that results in escape for instance) becomes 
part of what we then judge to be reduced wel- 
fare. It follows that good welfare involves not 
only good health and prospects for future 
health as judged by a human observer, but 
good welfare as perceived by the animal. If a cage 
without cover is perceived by the animal as 
highly aversive; then there is less than good 
welfare, even for a healthy animal. 
As argued earlier, we have rio a priori way of 
knowing what will be positively or negatively 
reinforcing to an animal, or even whether an 
animal is able to associate a specific response 
with obtaining or avoiding a given reinforcer. 
Such insights have to be established by experi- 
ment. As we have also seen, the physiological 
measurements that have been made so far are 
almost all of the activation or exhaustion of the 
motor side of the system, not of the decision- 
making reinforcement mechanisms themselves. 
Until we have brain-scan or other techniques 
for deciding whether an animal evaluates a 
given situation as aversive or pleasurable, we 
must rely on the behavior of the animal itself 
and, in particular, on its choice behavior and 
its ability to associate arbitrary responses with 
rewards and punishments. 
Furthermore, we also have to establish 
whether a given reinforcer will cause an ani- 
mal to obtain what it needs or to get away from 
what it finds aversive (Dawkins 1990). If the 
animal shows little evidence of being able to 
change its circumstances, then probably the 
change will make little difference to its welfare. 
But if the animal will literally "do anything" to 
get something it wants, or to escape from the 
conditions in which it is being held, the change 
may be very important. An animal that will 
push heavy weights, give large numbers of ar- 
bitrary responses (such as pecking a key or 
pressing a lever), cross an electric grid or oth- 
erwise give high priority to obtaining a positive 
reinforcer or getting away from a negative 
one, is demonstrating the value it places on 
that reinforcer. Matthews and Ladewig (1994) 
used the number of presses on a nose plate 
that pigs made as the response with either 
food or social contact with another pig as the 
reward. When they increased the "price" by 
making the pigs push the plate notjust once 
but up to 30 times for each reward, they founid 
that the pigs were willing to pay the higher 
price for food and worked harder and harder 
for the same number of rewards. By contrast, 
when social contact was the reward, ihey found 
that the pigs did not work as hard and thus 
obtained fewer rewards. Despite the difficul- 
ties that clearly exist with this approach (e.g., 
Dawkins 1990, 1997; Houston 1997; Mason et 
al. 1998), this method is still the only one that 
endeavors to show the animal's "point of view." 
Choice and reinforcement mechanisms thus 
occupy a very special place in the evaluation 
of animal welfare. 
At the same time, however, it is important 
not to put too much emphasis on what animals 
may or may not find reinforcing. By now it will 
be quite clear that animals do not always act 
to benefit their fitness. This will be true even 
under natural conditions. For example, a mi- 
grating wildebeest may choose to cross a river, 
but then is eaten by a crocodile. On average, 
migration-including crossing rivers-is ben- 
eficial, but sometimes it isn't, even in natural 
environments (RDawkins 1982). In unnatural 
environments, however, the likelihood of an 
animal choosing an option that lowers rather 
than raises its long-term fitness becomes much 
greater, because it is more likely to be con- 
fronted with a range of options for which it is 
not adapted. Its ancestors may have lived in 
environments in which absence of cover meant 
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death by predation, and only those survived 
that remained hidden. Unnatural environments 
may also lead animals to make inappropriate 
choices. For example, an animal may find a 
sweet taste highly reinforcing because (in an 
adaptive sense) in its natural environment this 
preference led it to seek out fruit and honey. 
In a captive environment, however, the rein- 
forcing properties of a sweet taste could lead 
it either to ingest nonnutritive saccharine or 
to overconsume freely available sucrose, nei- 
ther of which would increase its fitness. 
What animals find positively and negatively 
reinforcing should therefore not be used in 
isolation as a measure of welfare, any more 
than any other single measure should be. But 
knowing what animals find pleasurable or 
aversive often allows us to make sense of other 
measures such as physiological changes. What 
the animal prefers and will work for (or get 
away from) is thus not a luxury to be tagged 
on to other more "real" measurements such 
as physiological parameters, but is completely 
central to the proper evaluation of all welfare. 
It is what distinguishes animals and plants and 
gives rise to our moral concern for animal wel- 
fare. It helps us to make sense of other mea- 
sures, and provides a framework in which they 
can be evaluated. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT 
METHODS OF ASSESSMENT 
I have argued that applied welfare research 
stands to benefit greatly by becoming more 
Darwinian in its outlook. Essentially, this 
means pursuing the consequences of viewing 
the so-called indicators of welfare as adapta- 
tions to deal with threats to the animal's fit- 
ness, subject always to the proviso that adapta- 
tions can only be understood in the context of 
the environment in which they were evolved. 
To be more explicit, I will argue that the most 
practically useful and evolutionarily impor- 
tant measures of welfare fall into two catego- 
ries: primary measures that are direct threats 
to fitness, and secondary ones that are per- 
ceived as threats to fitness. 
Primary measures of welfare include such fac- 
tors as injury, disease, exhaustion of muscle 
tissue, and dehydration. Here an animal's abil- 
ity to survive and reproduce is directly re- 
duced, in much the same way that a machine's 
ability to carry out its work is reduced if a part 
is broken or damaged. An injured animal's fit- 
ness is directly reduced, for instance, if it can 
no longer flee from predators. For this reason, 
I have stressed the importance of veterinary 
evidence about good or poor health as the first 
and essential measure of welfare. Animals have 
evolved a number of mechanisms, however, to 
avoid getting themselves into such dire straits 
in the first place. These include mobilizing the 
HPA system and changing their glucose me- 
tabolism so that they are better able to run 
away from danger; such mechanisms enable 
animals to avoid dangerous situations, and 
even play "Russian Roulette" with their im- 
mune systems, in the interests of reproduc- 
tion. Such mechanisms-ones that come into 
play before (or to avoid) primary threats to 
fitness-can lead to secondary consequiences. 
Secondary measures of welfare orperceived threats 
to fitness may be activated when the animal's 
health is still good, and skeptics may then ar- 
gue that there is no welfare problem, thus con- 
fusing the issue. Since the animal is behaving 
as if its fitness were threatened, however, and 
either taking or attempting avoidance actions, 
its welfare may be reduced just as much as if 
for a primary threat already evident. As Hofer 
and East (1998) put it: "Natural selection max- 
imises fitness but not necessarily the well-being 
of organisms." A major problem, but no worse 
than that encountered by Nesse and Williams 
(1995) in their discussion of human medicine, 
is distinguishing between cases where the sec- 
ondary mechanisms are effective (i.e., where 
the behavior or physiological mechanisms are 
the animal's way of dealing or coping with a 
danger) and where secondary mechanisms are 
ineffective and pathological. Clearly, interven- 
tion to "prevent suffering" is much more ap- 
propriate in the second case than in the first. 
There are a number of important conse- 
quences of taking this Darwinian view of ani- 
mal welfare: 
1. High priority should always be given to 
primary threats to fitness (i.e., veterinary 
measures of welfare) since these have 
been major selective forces in the lives of 
all animals. 
2. Individual secondary measures of wel- 
fare should not bejudged to be "unrelia- 
ble" just because they do not correlate 
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consistently with primary measures. Ani- 
mals usually have more than one kind 
of danger to avoid. They have complex 
tradeoffs at all levels in order to mini- 
mize reductions of fitness in facing a 
wide range of threats. At different imes 
of the day or year, or depending on ex- 
ternal circumstances, they will reallocate 
priorities: For example, animals may de- 
press or enhance their immune responses, 
increase or decrease their physiological 
"stress" responses, or find some stimuli 
more or less aversive. Such changes should 
not be seen as a nuisance or inconsistent 
with primary measures (although they 
may well complicate the interpretation 
of an animal's welfare). Rather, they re- 
sult from the complexity of an animal's 
adaptive response to various dangers. 
3. We should not expect that the response 
to all dangers should be the same. Given 
that the most adaptive response (at all 
levels in the body) may vary, depending 
on whether the danger is from dehydra- 
tion, disease or predator attack, it is most 
unlikely that there will be a single mea- 
sure of poor welfare, even a multicompo- 
nent one, that can be identified in all 
cases where the fitness of the animal is 
actually or potentially compromised. 
Rather, the responses of a given species 
should be studied separately when it 
meets threats of predation, dehydration, 
or absence of social companions. It may 
turn out, when the behavioral, physio- 
logical and biochemical data from these 
various situations are analysed and com- 
pared, that they will have a common com- 
ponent or syndrome of poor welfare that 
can be identified. This should be regarded 
as a fortunate and even somewhat sur- 
prising finding, however, and not some- 
thing to be expected in advance. 
4. Particular efforts should be made to 
identify the common components of sit- 
uations that animals find aversive from 
those that they find pleasurable. No indi- 
cator of stress or poor welfare should be 
labeled as such unless it is clearly more 
than a symptom of excitement or readi- 
ness for action. In animals there is con- 
siderable overlap between preparation 
for action to gain something the animal 
wants, and preparation for action to es- 
cape something it finds aversive. The 
same limbs and muscles are used in both 
behaviors, together with the same en- 
ergy needs. The difference is whether an 
animal decides that a given situation is 
positively or negatively reinforcing. Thus, 
particular emphasis should be given to 
an animal's own choice and reinforce- 
ment mechanisms; although these are 
not an infallible guide to welfare in them- 
selves, they do allow us to make sense of 
all the other measures. They tell us what 
the animal finds rewarding or aversive. 
And by finding out how hard an animal 
will work to change its situation, we can 
learn something about the strength of its 
motivation to change. The finely tuned 
system of primary and secondary rein- 
forcements that have evolved that enable 
animals to deal with the costs and bene- 
fits of different courses of action are a 
major secondary mechanism for avoid- 
ing primary threats to fitness. As such, 
they constitute both our best chance to 
view the way another species perceives its 
world and, ironically, a major source of 
poor welfare in themselves. If animals 
did not perceive various situations as 
"punishing," assessing their welfare would 
be quite easy. 
Although insights from evolutionary biol- 
ogy can thus benefit applied animal welfare 
studies, other areas of biology can also benefit 
from some of the issues raised by animal wel- 
fare. Indeed, it could be argued that attempts 
to find valid ways of measuring welfare have 
thrown into sharp relief some important is- 
sues: how is behavior controlled, how do hor- 
mones such as corticosteroids function in the 
body, and how are animal decision-making 
mechanisms related to fitness in the long tenn? 
Above all, issues of animal welfare force us 
to look at consciousness and its evolution. In 
almost all other areas of biology, questions 
about consciousness can be put to one side 
in the best behaviorist manner. Learning and 
reinforcement mechanisms (and even emo- 
tions) can be discussed independently of 
whether animals are consciously aware of what 
they are doing. But a concern for animal wel- 
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fare does not permit such a convenient eva- 
sion. Our own consciousness is an ever-pres- 
ent reality. If we believe in the explanatory 
power of natural selection, we have at the very 
least to consider the possibility that conscious- 
ness evolved by natural selection. If so, it must 
either be a factor in the life of an organism, 
or be a most extraordinary epiphenomenon 
(Dawkins 1993). But if consciousness has phe- 
notypic effects, it should be possible to find 
out what these are, and to discover what is dif- 
ferent about organisms that possess it. This in 
turn leads to questions about how to find out 
which organisms have conscious experiences. 
Practical problems of animal welfare thus 
force a radical reevaluation of what constitute 
legitimate topics of biological research, as well 
as link diverse fields from molecular immunol- 
ogy to behavior, all of which contribute to the 
common goal of understanding the range 
of fitness-enhancing mechanisms that have 
evolved in animals. As a framework for a 
broadly based mechanistic biology, animal 
welfare is central to much of modern biology, 
even though "pure" biologists may not always 
realize it. All branches of biology are affected 
by the issues raised in animal welfare. 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
WELFARE AND "SUFFERING" 
In a thoughtful and provocative essay, enti- 
tled "The myth of animal suffering," Bermond 
(1997) correctly points out that none of the 
methods proposed so far for assessing "suffer- 
ing" in animals actually do so. "Suffering," as 
applied to humans, means conscious experi- 
ence of something very unpleasant. Strictly 
speaking, none of the measures of "poor wel- 
fare" or "stress" discussed so far demonstrates 
the presence of comparable states in nonhu- 
man animals. They could all be occurring in 
organisms without consciousness that are pro- 
grammed in various ways to respond adap- 
tively as far as the animal's fitness is con- 
cerned. As we have seen, adaptive responses 
to a range of stressors occur in plants as well 
as animals. Even measures that distinguish re- 
sponses to danger in animals from those of 
plants-namely, the ability to show reinforced 
behavior-carry no necessary implications of 
conscious experience. Although there are 
striking similarities between the way rats and 
humans respond to certain situations such as 
hunger and cold (Cabanac 1992), it does not 
follow that both species are consciously expe- 
riencing hunger and cold. Even the fact that 
humans say they are consciously experiencing 
"suffering" from cold and then proceed to be- 
have like rats in seeking warmth, does not 
mean that rats also consciously experience the 
same thing, tempting as it is to conclude that 
they do (Dawkins 1993). The reason why such 
a conclusion would be invalid is both instruc- 
tive and subtle. 
One of the findings that has emerged from 
recent neurophysiological research is the con- 
cept of "multiple routes to action"-the idea 
that the same action can be ordered by differ- 
ent parts of the brain, some of them giving rise 
to conscious experiences and others resulting 
in quite automatic responses when people re- 
port no conscious experiences (Rolls 1998). 
An obvious example is driving a car; some- 
times we can be conscious of every action, and 
at other times we are effectively on "autopilot" 
and not conscious of what we are doing. The 
important point is that when our actions are 
under conscious control, we do not lose the 
unconscious pathways. On the contrary, we re- 
tain them, often reverting to them for routine 
actions that we have done many times before; 
we use the conscious pathways only for dealing 
with novel situations. Indeed, our conscious 
minds are often not as good at dealing with 
routine tasks as taking the unconscious route 
(Baars 1988). So the fact that we share many 
physiological mechanisms and behavioral re- 
sponses with other species, particularly mam- 
mals, cannot be used as conclusive evidence 
that they share our conscious experiences, 
too. It would be possible to argue that they 
simply use the same neural pathways that we 
use for automatic, unconscious actions. They 
may possess many similarities to ourselves, but 
not that of shared conscious experiences. 
With a brain and an ability to think ahead ten 
years, you may decide to take out health insur- 
ance or make other provisions for the future. 
But this does not mean that your pain mecha- 
nisms or injury responses become redundant, 
or that you should stop avoiding situations 
that are likely to lead to injury. The death-defy- 
ing, fitness-increasing mechanisms we share 
with other animals could simply have been 
This content downloaded from 129.67.117.205 on Fri, 19 Jul 2013 06:03:00 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
324 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY VOLUME 73 
augmented by a conscious ability to plan ration- 
ally for the future. The ability to avoid injury 
that we see in many species, through their fear 
or their ability to be aware of impending doom 
has enabled us to lessen the chances of fitness 
reduction or avoid danger entirely some weeks, 
months, or years before danger appears. The 
question is thus notwhether there are similari- 
ties between humans and other species in re- 
sponses to dangerous or aversive situations 
(because there clearly are), but which similari- 
ties are specifically relevant to the likelihood 
of shared conscious experiences. 
Bermond himself argues that both a well- 
developed prefrontal cortex and a right neo- 
cortex structure are necessary and therefore 
that conscious emotional experiences are only 
to be expected in anthropoid apes and possi- 
bly dolphins. Such a hardware-dependent ex- 
planation assumes, of course, that conscious 
experiences are unique to particular brain struc- 
tures, and ignores the possibility that in species 
very different from us, other brain pathways 
could give rise to consciousness by using dif- 
ferent hardware. Even the determinedly Dar- 
winian view that if consciousness evolved by 
natural selection it must have a detectable ef- 
fect on some aspect of an animal's behavior 
or physiology, and do something to enhance 
fitness (Dawkins 1993), does not free us from 
this dilemma. If consciousness enhances ex- 
isting danger-avoiding and reward-seeking 
mechanisms by enabling them to operate ear- 
lier and earlier, it is very difficult o see where 
unconscious learning mechanisms are re- 
placed by conscious experiences. It might be 
that conscious experiences or qualia are pres- 
ent in many animals which "feel" hunger or 
fear in very much the way we do. But it could 
also be, for those who wish to take a hard line, 
that the basic physiological and behavioral 
mechanisms were in place and fully functional 
long before consciousness evolved, and all 
that consciousness did was to add an extra abil- 
ity to deal with longer time scales or greater 
complexity. 
All this emphasizes that consciousness re- 
mains "the hard problem" of biology (Shear 
1997). Easy (although often complex) prob- 
lems are questions such as how animals dis- 
criminate different objects or how behavior is 
controlled. The hard problem is why, when we 
make a discrimination, it feels like anything at 
all. Why, in other words, does pain hurt? 
The fact that we cannot yet solve the hard 
problem does not mean that we should rule 
out the possibility of including it some day in 
the science of animal welfare. The current state 
of animal welfare is the study of health, fitness 
and the various mechanisms animals have 
evolved for ensuring future health and fitness. 
Such studies can be carried out without any 
mention of the conscious experience of "suffer- 
ing." But a complete science of animal welfare 
would include a consideration of the conscious 
experiences of animals, just as a complete 
study of biology would. To that extent, biology 
is incomplete, too. Animal welfare studies, by 
focusing on the feelings an animal might experi- 
ence, have brought a whole new dimension 
to the study of animal consciousness, which 
otherwise emphasizes purely the intellectual 
achievements of animals as the key to under- 
standing their consciousness (Griffin 1992; 
Bekoff and Jamieson 1996). Cognitive ethol- 
ogy emphasizes cognitive abilities, whereas in 
the context of animal welfare, emotions are 
more important. The often quoted phrase of 
Jeremy Bentham is relevant here: "The ques- 
tion is not Can they Reason?, nor Can they 
Talk? but Can they Suffer?" The question Ben- 
tham had in mind was that of which organisms 
deserve moral consideration, but it could 
equally well be used as to mean the question 
of which animals might possess consciousness. 
The key to the origin of consciousness itself 
may lie in the emotional experience of suffer- 
ing (Dawkins 1993). 
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